Since the publication of Amoris Laetitia nine years ago, faithful Catholics from all quarters of the Church have expressed concern about the confusion that has followed in the wake of the Exhortation’s eighth chapter (AL8).
We share that concern and have explained why at some length in our recent essay The Doctrinal Implications of Amoris Laetitia’s Chapter Eight.”
We did not delve into this matter lightly, and we certainly don’t want to make it harder for the faithful to trust magisterial teachings. But because the salvation of many souls is at stake, we are convinced that it would ill serve the Church to ignore this sincere concern. We wish to be of assistance to the numerous validly married Catholics—tens of thousands of active Catholics around the world—who are in a second union involving sexual activity that they are strongly tempted to regard as acceptable in God’s sight.
Is our concern misplaced?
We said we would welcome a response that could show us that our concern is misplaced, and we are grateful to Pedro Gabriel (PG) for attempting to do just that. Unfortunately, however, his attempt fails to reassure us. Indeed, since his best arguments fall so far short of the rebuttal that he claims them to be, his response only intensifies our concern. And while he says the problem is not with the ambiguity of the document itself but with articles like ours that read ambiguity into it, his efforts to substantiate that claim miss the mark entirely.
Before we reply to PG’s central arguments, we would like briefly to address his titular claim that we are “Stuck in 2017.” If we are stuck anywhere, it is in 2016, the year the document was published, raising the sincere and serious concerns of so many faithful Catholics—concerns to which AL’s defenders have yet to offer a satisfying reply. Those concerns don’t go away with the mere passage of time. In fact, because of the confusion and harm caused by the failure to address them over the past decade, those concerns have only increased.
AL8 teaches that in some cases a person bound by a valid marital bond who lives more coniugale (in a marital way) with someone other than his or her valid spouse may receive and so be admitted to Holy Communion without resolving to cease living more coniugale.
Our essay raises the concern that this teaching seems to implicitly contradict at least one of the following revealed truths: (1) no one should receive the Eucharist without being willing to conform his or her life to the objective demands of the Gospel; (2) a consummated Christian marriage is absolutely indissoluble; (3) for a married person to have sex with someone other than his or her valid spouse is always adulterous; or (4) adultery is always gravely wrong.
Holy Communion and mitigated responsibility
Almost all of PG’s arguments share the same assumption about what constitutes proper pastoral care for some who wish to receive the Eucharist without resolving to avoid extramarital sexual activity. That assumption is that although they do what is objectively gravely wrong even after being properly accompanied, they should be admitted to the Eucharist because the priest can have “moral security” that they are not subjectively culpable of mortal sin. PG says that Francis means to apply his novel permissions to this precise population: “the cohort that Francis has in mind is precisely those who are ‘invincibly ignorant or incapable of exercising their free will.’” They receive the Eucharist, “not as a ‘prize,’ but as ‘medicine and nourishment.’” The teaching of AL8, then, or so PG argues, is for “sacramental grace to be received precisely by those who will most benefit from it (especially taking into consideration that they are not in mortal sin)” (emphasis added).
PG claims that we exhibit a faulty conception of mitigated responsibility: “The problem is that Brugger and Ryan (alongside most of the critics of Amoris Laetitia) have an overly restrictive interpretation of what constitutes ‘invincibly ignorant or incapable of exercising their free will.’” Our response will make it clear that our understanding of mitigated responsibility is by no means overly restrictive.
We fully acknowledge that inculpability for gravely wrongful behavior, including adultery, is possible; and that it occurs when a person lacks sufficient reflection or deliberate consent, or both. And we are well aware of the Catechism’s teaching, quoted by PG, that “the promptings of feelings and passions … external pressures or pathological disorders” can diminish or nullify culpability, as can duress, fear, irresistible habit, hostility, anger, desire, severe sadness or other disorders of the will (CCC 1860; also see 1735).
Indeed, our essay pointed out that AL8 makes statements to the effect that concrete factors can mitigate moral responsibility, that culpability is not the same in all cases, and that concrete circumstances should be taken into consideration when assessing whether these couples are free to receive the Eucharist.
But these statements do not erase the document’s persistent ambiguous suggestion that some who are not invincibly ignorant or morally incapacitated may receive the Eucharist.
Since the question of who may rightly receive the Eucharist has such importance with respect to the salvation of souls, one would expect the document to remove all ambiguity about this matter. One would think that it would state, or at least clearly imply, that Eucharistic communion is reserved only for those who do not meet the subjective conditions, properly understood, for mortal sin. But far from stating or even implying this, the document seems to suggest the opposite.
Proper accompaniment ordinarily ensures sufficient reflection
Referring to divorced and remarried individuals living more coniugale, AL8 states that priests should help them “to understand their situation according to the teaching of the Church.” The text continues:
Conversation with the priest, in the internal forum, contributes to the formation of a correct judgment on what hinders the possibility of a fuller participation in the life of the Church.… This discernment can never prescind from the Gospel demands of truth and charity, as proposed by the Church.
PG believes that through this conversation with the priest—what PG calls “a personal and pastoral discernment”—the priest can achieve “‘moral security’ that the [accompanied] person is not in mortal sin.” We think this confidence is dangerously mistaken.
If priests are determined to correctly form these people’s consciences on what hinders their ecclesial participation, they will certainly speak about what AL8 itself admits is these people’s “objective situation of sin.” Pastors must take seriously the document’s admonition to “never prescind from the Gospel demands of truth and charity, as proposed by the Church.” Indeed, AL8 teaches that “every effort should be made to encourage the development of an enlightened conscience.”
But if pastors follow this instruction and patiently explain the serious discrepancy between people’s “objective situation of sin” and the Gospel’s demands, one wonders: how can pastors achieve “security” that those they accompany are unable to recognize that they are morally obliged to conform their lives to the Gospel before they can rightly receive the Eucharist?
We argued that if the pastor’s effort is guided by the Gospel and the teachings of the Church, then it is reasonable to presume that sufficient reflection will ordinarily be achieved in those they accompany. What basis is there for denying that this will ordinarily be the case? To say that properly accompanied individuals will not ordinarily be capable of grasping the principles of the moral law bearing on adultery condescendingly implies a low estimation of the intelligence of the faithful.
Silence and ambiguity
AL8 could have precluded confusion by setting out the traditional teaching about what is required of these individuals after they have undertaken proper conscience formation (which the document itself enjoins): before receiving the Eucharist, these individuals should first be reconciled in the sacrament of Penance. This requires “repenting of having broken the sign of the Covenant and of fidelity to Christ,” and being “sincerely ready to undertake a way of life that is no longer in contradiction to the indissolubility of marriage” (John Paul II, Familiaris consortio 84). But AL8 says nothing of the sort, and its silence on this point makes it easy for those who have in fact achieved sufficient reflection to convince themselves that they are doing nothing wrong in living more coniugale. Is there no ambiguity here? We think there is.
PG also disputes our claim that in omitting the teaching that cohabitating couples should adopt perfect continence before receiving the Eucharist, AL8 ambiguously suggests this is not an objective moral requirement.
But we have good reason for making this claim. AL8 states that “the Church acknowledges situations ‘where, for serious reasons, such as the children’s upbringing, a man and woman cannot satisfy the obligation to separate’” (subquote from FC 84). But unlike John Paul II, AL8 says nothing further about how couples who have made such a decision should conduct themselves with respect to their sexual relationship. John Paul’s full quote reads:
This means, in practice, that when, for serious reasons, such as for example the children’s upbringing, a man and a woman cannot satisfy the obligation to separate, they “take on themselves the duty to live in complete continence, that is, by abstinence from the acts proper to married couples” [emphasis added].
Why does AL8 exclude the italicized statement? Might not readers understandably conclude that some unmarried couples are not obliged to live in complete continence? Is there no ambiguity here? Again, we think there is.
As if this were not ambiguous enough, AL8 appends footnote 329:
In such situations, many people, knowing and accepting the possibility of living “as brothers and sisters” which the Church offers them, point out that if certain expressions of intimacy are lacking, “it often happens that faithfulness is endangered and the good of the children suffers.”
The reference to “accepting the possibility” is unclear. Does it mean that they accept the requirement to live as brother and sister? Or does it mean that they recognize it is possible for them to do so, but because of bad consequences, they might not adopt that possibility?
Commenting on this note, PG writes: “It must be pointed out, Francis is not necessarily validating this idea, but simply exposing the fact that many people, who accepted the possibility of living ‘as brother and sister,’ pointed out this problem.” Fair enough. We need not assume that Francis is “necessarily” endorsing anyone’s decision not to adopt perfect continence. But he also does not teach here or even suggest that failing to live as brother and sister would be objectively adulterous and endanger their salvation. So, the quotation leaves the ambiguous suggestion that if the consequences are serious enough, adulterous intimacy may sometimes be justified. We are mystified by the suggestion that passages like these do not leave the reader in doubt about this crucial matter.
To judge whether someone living more coniugale is culpable, we must further consider whether the person has sufficient reflection that doing so is gravely wrong, and also consider whether he or she gives deliberate consent. We shall deal with each in turn.
Insufficient reflection due to persistent intense emotion?
One might ask whether what we said above deals with all potential cases of insufficient reflection. Isn’t it the case that passions such as fear, hostility, anger, desire, and severe sadness can compromise sufficient reflection? Aquinas acknowledges that people under the influence of passions can act contrary to their knowledge (see S.t., 1-2, q. 77, a. 2c.). If vehement emotions distract these persons from their awareness of the grave wrongness of what they are doing when they engage in objectively adulterous behavior, then even if they choose that behavior, they would not have sufficient reflection for mortal sin.
Does this basis for insufficient reflection—that of being afflicted by persistent intense emotion—plausibly describe the situation of couples who choose to continue to live more coniugale even after proper accompaniment by a priest?
We deny that this is a credible reading of AL8. The text never frames the persons under consideration as suffering from a persistent state of vehement passion. It considers people who, after engaging in a measured—and apparently conscience-enlightening—process of priestly accompaniment, decide to remain in their objectively adulterous relationships; they intend to continue living more coniugale. Their decision may be difficult. They may feel between a rock and a hard place. They may even feel great distress. But none of this suggests that they are living in an enduring heat-of-passion state that prevents them, over time, from exercising calm deliberation, attending to their awareness of the grave wrongness of remaining in such a relationship, and resolving to extricate themselves from it.
Insufficient reflection despite proper accompaniment?
But might it not be the case that some people will simply be unable to grasp the truth that extra-marital sexual activity is gravely wrong even in their difficult circumstances?
Although it is ordinarily the case that properly accompanied people will realize that sexual activity outside of their true marriage is a grave matter, it is possible that some will be unable to grasp this truth. Such people will, of course, realize that this is what the Church teaches—they will realize that mortal sin is the label the Church puts on such sexual activity. But they may feel that under their difficult circumstances, living more coniugale is not wrong for them because they understand neither (a) what it is that makes this sexual activity be a grave matter, nor (b) that they are obliged to avoid engaging in it even if they don’t understand why it is gravely wrong because being Catholic means accepting the truth that the Church’s definitive teaching is inspired by the Holy Spirit.
People in really difficult situations sometimes honestly come to the erroneous conclusion that doing what the Church identifies as a mortal sin is the best moral response available to them. If so, they do not have an adequate grasp that this really is mortally sinful. When they consider the alternative, it can seem to them that doing what looks like a mortal sin is the best they can do. If that is really what is going on in their minds—if the alternative really does strike them as morally worse—then even if they make the wrong choice when grave matter is involved, they are not committing a mortal sin. They do not have sufficient reflection.
However, the process of accompaniment proposed by AL8 itself plainly rules this out in most cases. The priest’s job is to help the person form “an enlightened conscience” about what hinders the possibility of a fuller participation in the life of the Church. Since the hindrance to that fuller participation is the person’s living more coniugale, the priest is charged to help the person understand why that is so—why engaging in intimate relations with someone other than one’s true spouse is an obstacle to enjoying intimacy with Jesus in the Eucharist. As AL8 points out, the priest’s counsel “can never prescind from the Gospel demands of truth and charity, as proposed by the Church.”
These considerations, along with the realization that people are easily inclined to rationalize what they know to be illicit sexual activity, make it clear that this state of mind, though not impossible, will be rare for people who have been properly accompanied.
Inculpability due to incapacity for deliberate consent?
Might it be the case that while these people do not lack sufficient reflection, they are not culpable because they are incapable of deliberate consent?
We certainly acknowledge, with the Catechism and Aquinas, that the violence of coercion and/or the influence of severe mental illness can render a person’s behavior, including objectively adulterous behavior, involuntary (see CCC 1735, 1860; S.t., 1–2, q. 6, a. 5; a. 7, ad 3). But it is obvious that most of the people being accompanied do not fall into those categories. Then too, as noted above in our consideration of sufficient reflection, there is no reason to think that those being accompanied are living in an enduring heat-of-passion state that prevents them over time from exercising calm deliberation, attending to their awareness of the grave wrongness of remaining in such a relationship, and resolving to extricate themselves from it.
Indeed, the fact that AL8 itself never states or even implies that the divorced and remarried who are permitted to receive the Eucharist are to any significant extent drawn from the extremely narrow cohort of those who are incapable of deliberate consent makes it clear that such an interpretation is not credible.
Holy Communion for those who reject the Church’s teaching?
But even if people who wish to receive Holy Communion without resolving to conform their lives to the objective demands of the Gospel are in good faith, this does not make them apt candidates for receiving the Eucharist, for insofar as they reject the Church’s teaching on this matter, they place themselves outside the Church. God is not limited to the sacraments and can, of course, give them grace in other ways, and we should pray that they receive grace. Indeed, we should pray that they receive the grace to recognize that the Church’s teaching about the requirement to conform their lives to the objective demands of the Gospel is inspired by the Holy Spirit and binding on their consciences.
But as long as they reject that teaching, they should not receive the Eucharist, which expresses the unity of faith of the members of the Body of Christ.
Holy Communion for people culpable of mortal sin?
Just before his “Conclusion,” PG asks whether sinners with diminished culpability should receive the Eucharist, and he responds, “If they are not in mortal sin, yes, they really should.” He then asks, “But what if they are caught in a situation of sin?” Although that expression is not very precise, it is important to notice that he asks this question only after having dealt with sinners who are not culpable of mortal sin. It therefore seems clear that he is dealing with a new category, namely, people who are culpable of mortal sin.
He answers that question in the affirmative and with great confidence: “Even then, they should commune all the more.” This claim contradicts his own understanding of the teaching of AL, for he calls it a misinterpretation to say “[t]hat Amoris Laetitia Allows Communion to Impenitent Sinners.” Yet here he says, “They can only begin their journey back to the faith with the help of sacramental grace.” But why should we think that people who are culpable of grave sin receive sacramental grace by receiving the Eucharist if they are unwilling to confess that sin in the Sacrament of Penance with the resolution to avoid it in the future?
Perhaps PG does not mean that people subjectively guilty of mortal sin and unwilling to repent should “commune all the more,” for he does not suggest such a view elsewhere. Nevertheless, his treatment of the matter leaves the reader wondering: Does he really mean what he seems to be saying—that unrepentant mortal sinners should receive the Eucharist? Would they not be doing precisely what St. Paul, out of deep concern for the salvation of souls, strongly warns against, namely, eating and drinking to their own condemnation (see 1 Cor 11: 27–29)?
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Thank you both again.
Practically speaking, who can doubt that unrepentant mortal sinners walk up and receive Holy Communion all the time. AL is a disaster because it seeks to enable such behavior, like the attempt of this pontificate to bless such unions.
Because Christ wants us to be in authentic union with Him, He loves us by calling all to repentance and dying for our sins.
Happy Lent!
After a dozen years of Synodaling, this pontificate can be summarized as an elaborate attempt to avoid repentance.
Francis if fundamentally no different than other post VII liberal moral theologians who felt free to delude themselves that the primary purpose of moral theology was to alleviate troubling guilt feelings, to “rethink” immorality in such a way that what used to be thought of as an objective wrong can now be perceived as benign. The price of “accompaniment” always leads to blind spots, failures to consider repercussions of our behavior that God knows and warns us about even while we continue to delude ourselves. Francis never showed a lot of his self-praising “mercy, mercy, mercy” towards the abandoned families when men run off with their mistresses to start new “families.”
My prior comment’s opening sentence should begin: Francis is fundamentally…. The difficulty of composing on a mobile device without my glasses.
I watched an interview with Julia Meloni, now well known for her landmark book, The St. Gallen Mafia, where she recounts her turning point towards Francis being Amoris Laetitia. It is obvious that it rationalizes moral relativism as though the consequences of rationalizations cannot have terrible results. Where would God be in such a process? Does God not care about the immoral things we do and the harm we do to the victims of our sins and the lies we tell ourselves as though there are no victims? One would think anyone beyond adolescence gives some thought to whether they are kidding themselves now and then. And when it comes to serious matters, for a Pope to remain oblivious to such basic human realities?
This crisis became so self-evident to Ms. Meloni that she simply focused her book on how a cabal of modernist prelates could plan to enable such a rather shallow mind to find his way to the head of God’s Church. I don’t want to beat up on Francis, who probably did not even write AL. If he is indeed motivated by what he believes is a generous heart, then, charitably, we know it has been horribly, horribly misguided.
My brain explodes.
This is a brilliant and crystal clear article, but I am so sorry it has come to this: that good men have to bend over backward to insist (borrowing from GK Chesterton) that grass is green or 2+2=4. And sadder still that other priests bend over backward to try to explain away and defend utter nonsense. I remember having to read a horrific pretzel twisting explanation on this same issue, one that the Vatican recommended, on how “conscience” can (essentially) approve any crazy thing you please.
There was a great scene in the movie comedy “Office Space” where the man behind a digital scheme to defraud his company of fractions of pennies (eventually resulting in hundreds of thousands of dollars) was just fine…..his girlfriend said “so basically, stealing.” Here we are again. Long explanations for what is, in plain English, sin.
“I remember having to read a horrific pretzel twisting explanation on this same issue, one that the Vatican recommended, on how “conscience” can (essentially) approve any crazy thing you please.”
We can know through both Faith and reason that such a conscience could in no way, shape, or form be in communion with Christ, thus such a twisting explanation would be, in fact, not an explanation at all.
SUMMARY: Connect the dots; Amoris Latitia = Fiducia Supplicans. That went well…
Read on:
The DIRECT consequence of Chapter 8 is specifically to legitimize homosexual “couples.” This is done by bundling these with the much larger demographic of biologically normal sexual activity by invalidly married “couples.” The ambiguity of Amoris Laetitia sets the stage for the ambiguous/semi-blessing of all irregular “couples” including those of the LGBTQ coalition.
The instructive ANALOGY is the global economic collapse of 2008. When bad bank loans were not being repaid, these were bundled with the full range of other banking instruments—with the idea that with dilution, all then would be well. Instead, the rotten apple thingy, and the whole barrel went belly up, so to speak.
Synodal master-of-ceremonies Cardinal Hollerich famously turned the lights on when he announced thusly about the immorality of homosexual actions (not inclinations): “I think that’s wrong. But I also believe that we are thinking ahead here in [terms of] teaching. As the Pope has expressed in the past, this can lead to a change in doctrine. Because I believe that the sociological-scientific foundation of this teaching is no longer correct.” https://www.newwaysministry.org/2022/02/04/leading-cardinal-in-synod-seeks-change-in-church-teachings-on-homosexuality/ This is different than any “attitude of welcoming” as he later attempted to backtrack.
NOR does synodal guru Cardinal Grech’s “stretching the grey area” square the circle, or the barrel or whatever. Even if this stretch is eventually masticated and processed by roundtable “synods.” Or by a post-synodal Study Group (?)…IF circles around doctrinal redefinitions or moral carve-outs from the inborn and universal natural law (the shelved Veritatis Splendor which reminds us that, “[t]he Church is no way the author or the arbiter of this [‘moral’] norm,” n. 95).
Brugger and Ryan clearly demonstrate a vital issue, that Pedro Gabriel’s argument drawn from Amoris Laetitia based on Pope Francis’ effort, suggested in ch 8 to explore reasons why those validly married living in a second relationship [more coniugale] should receive the Eucharist [if they qualify it would be under conditions such as psychological impairment affecting an extremely narrow segment], whereas Brugger Ryan clearly demonstrate that the obligation, omitted in Amoris is for the priest to inform them what the Church teaches and assist them in practicing those teachings.
When people like PG and the current pontiff have to perform theological somersaults to justify blatant refusal to adapt one’s life to the Gospel, and instead counsel adapting the Gospel to one’s life, they’re building on a foundation of jelly. Jesus did not say to the woman caught in adultery, “Go and sin no more — unless, of course, after a period of accompaniment I discern that your feelings and passions mitigate or nullify your culpability.”
Right.
Also, at John 4, the Samaritan woman at the well asks Jesus for His living water.
We do not hear Jesus grant that request. Instead Jesus asks the woman to bring her ‘husband,’ which she could not do. Since she had more than one, she had “none,” according to Jesus.
14 But whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst; but the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life.
15 The woman saith unto him, Sir, give me this water, that I thirst not, neither come hither to draw.
16 Jesus saith unto her, Go, call thy husband, and come hither.
17 The woman answered and said, I have no husband. Jesus said unto her, Thou hast well said, I have no husband:
18 For thou hast had five husbands; and he whom thou now hast is not thy husband: in that saidst thou truly.
This is an excellent article defending perennial Catholic teaching regarding who may or may not receive Holy Communion in situations of sin, specifically the grave sin of adultery. The Eucharist is the body, blood, soul, and divinity of Christ, God who became man. Only those baptized into Christ who are in the state of grace and living within the bossum of Holy Mother Church should approach the sacrament – with fear and trembling. “Lord, I am not worthy to receive you, but only say the word and my soul shall be healed.” Amen.
The last three paragraphs, in which the authors suggest that Pedro Gabriel is saying that those culpable for mortal sin, completely misinterpret Pedro.
The entire premise of AL Chapter 8 is about discernment of culpability, and allowing for the reception of the Sacraments of Penance and the Eucharist when the person’s culpability is diminished such that they are not committing mortal sin when they have sexual relations in the context of that relationship.
Some situations easily come to mind: situations where one partner fears the other, where they might lose access to their children, where they will be left destitute, etc. (There are certainly other situations that should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis).
These are the “situations of sin” that Pedro Gabriel is referring to. If you were familiar with any of the well-known defenses of Amoris Laetitia, you would know that they recognize and affirm the key doctrines:
1) One may not receive the Eucharist in a state of mortal sin,
2) Sex outside a valid marriage is objectively grave matter,
3) Any objectively grave sin is aways grave matter, but subjective culpability mau be diminished by mitigating factors.
4) No one can know with absolute certainty whether we are in a state of grace, this is something we must discern in good conscience. AL lays out a process of discernment with a pastor in particular cases.
Amoris Laetitia is very clear when read with these points in mind. Obviously if someone goes into such a situation of accompaniment with bad will, it could be abused, but chances are such a person won’t take the trouble and is going to receive communion anyway.
It seems the authors are determined to look at Amoris Laetitia with worst-case situations in mind. Ultimately it seems they have resigned themselves to dissent from the Magisterium. To what end?
The truth is the “they” of your last sentence can only refer to the Magisterial teaching of Francis. In paragraph eight of AL, the Franciscan Postmodern Magisterium dissents from the teaching of Christ and the prior 2000 year teaching of Scripture and Tradition.
It seems this Pontificate is determined to look at the Word of God with worst-case situations in mind. Ultimately, it seems they have resigned themselves to dissent in practice from Sacred Scripture and Tradition. To what end?
meiron and God’s Fool:
You have poked serious holes in the rationalization of popesplainer Mike Lewis, who, like many in his camp, look at the current exercisers of the Church’s Perpetual Magisterium as having a kind of extra authority to change teachings of the past that make up a part of the Perpetual Magisterium.
However, no current exercisers of the Magisterium nor any future exercisers of the Magisterium have the authority to teach anything contrary to the Perpetual Magisterium. Ryan and Brugger have every right to point out the errors in any would-be teaching that seeks to change part of the Perpetual Magisterium, and so those who defend the false teaching like Lewis and Gabriel and Pope Francis are the ones guilty of dissent from the authoritative Perpetual Magisterium while Ryan and Brugger are faithful sons of the Church in defending the Perpetual Magisterium.
No one can know with absolute certainty whether we are in a state of grace…
Utter nonsense. How many lies does someone have to use to whitewash their “concrete circumstances” to “discern” that their cowardly immoral decision to abandon their family to pursue another “family,” lies told to themselves or to an obliging “pastor” to know that they are culpable of directing contradicting the words and will of Christ? Why has the willingness to suffer become a bad thing in the “new Catholicism?”
And since when does the opinion of a pope in contradiction of magisterial teaching become magisterial in itself?
No one can know with absolute certainty whether we are in a state of grace…
Utter nonsense. How many lies does someone have to use to whitewash their “concrete circumstances” to “discern” that their cowardly immoral decision to abandon their family to pursue another “family,” lies they tell themselves or to an obliging “pastor,” to know that they are culpable of directly contradicting the words and will of Christ? Why has the willingness to suffer become a bad thing in the “new Catholicism?”
And since when does the opinion of a pope in contradiction of magisterial teaching become magisterial in itself?
Edward, it is de fide dogma, taught by the council of Trent, that we cannot know with absolute certainty that we are in a state of grace.
Look up these quotes from the Council of Trent:
CANON IX.- “no one can know with a certainty of faith, which can not be subject to error, that he has obtained the grace of God.”
CANON XIII.—”If any one saith, that it is necessary for every one, for the obtaining the remission of sins, that he believe for certain, and without any wavering arising from his own infirmity and indisposition, that his sins are forgiven him: let him be anathema.”
CANON XVI.—”If any one saith, that he will for certain, of an absolute and infallible certainty, have that great gift of perseverance unto the end,—unless he have learned this by special revelation: let him be anathema.”
It’s derived from St Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians (1 Cor 4:3-5):
“I care very little if I am judged by you or by any human court; indeed, I do not even judge myself. My conscience is clear, but that does not make me innocent. It is the Lord who judges me. Therefore judge nothing before the appointed time; wait until the Lord comes. He will bring to light what is hidden in darkness and will expose the motives of the heart.”
This passage (“My conscience is clear, but that does not make me innocent. It is the Lord who judges me.”) is interpreted by Catholic Tradition as meaning we cannot have absolute assurance that we are in a state of grace or that we will be saved. Trent leaves a little bit of room for “special revelation” – perhaps in cases like the good thief or the children at Fatima, but that’s extremely rare.
The first point is from Chapter IX, not Canon IX, of the 6th Session. The same session also teaches that “If any one saith, that the commandments of God are, even for one that is justified and constituted in grace, impossible to keep; let him be anathema.” (Canon XVIII)
I have had many back-and-forths with Pedro about this. He has never satisfyingly explained how one can deliberately choose what is known to be objectively grave matter but not gravely offend God. The entire logic of “grave matter” hinges on the inability of such deliberate consent being able to end in an act that is anything other than a grave sin. That one’s culpability can be increased or diminished is granted by all, but when such matter is in fact chosen deliberately this change is only a change with respect to how bad one’s grave sin is, because such an act is contrary to charity so as to be incompatible with it. This is simply what it is to be grave matter. Many murders and perjuries and sacrileges are done under some kind of duress. And no doubt this makes them less heinous than those which are done just for fun. But this is why we pray “lead us not into temptation…” Unless one’s reason is overcome with acute fear or some other true inhibitory state where the higher intellect is incapable of exercising its act, then one’s choice after thinking constitutes a determinate will to offend God gravely. The entire moral tradition will back this opinion. Pedro has no response to this but to insist that his opponents don’t like John Paul II’s Catechism. That’s a junk argument. He has to show that deliberately choosing any number of grave sins is “not so bad” if there are “mitigating circumstances” diminishing culpability. He can’t, and he won’t. It’s a fixation on adultery, because that is what Francis has talked about. Imagine down south where the N’Dragheta operate – you realize how people are pressured into doing awful things, right? Is it venial sin to direct drug running or human trafficking – because if you don’t something bad might happen to you or someone you care about? No. It is mortal sin. Not as bad as those with less pressure. But that was what Pilate was told to – that he had the lesser sin. In the end one has to pick up one’s cross and carry it. No “discernment” removes this requirement.
And this does not address at all the nature of public scandal given, etc., which is connected but distinct as a conversation. FWIW, in the 1917 code we are told that Holy Communion ought to be withheld in private if the minister knows the soul to be in sin, but not publicly unless it is publicly known. But marriage is a public act, people are led to believe bigamy is acceptable, etc., etc. I heard once of a woman whose husband left her, “married” another woman, and merciful Father Pastor had pulled this “discernment” stunt with him… Imagine the mercy his wife showed him when she confronted him over why her husband is publicly receiving Holy Communion with “that woman”… It is unjust to her, as well… nobody ever talks about “discernment” or “accompaniment” or “mercy” for the putative spouse who is out of sight, out of mind. That is why we have a court system. It’s why we have laws. Enough with the vigilantism.
Wait a minute, are you serious? First off, you toss in the Sacrament of Penance with the reception Eucharist. NOBODY is saying that these couples should be denied the Sacrament of Penance and it is dishonest of you to pretend that reception of this sacrament is part of the discussion.
Secondly, you offer “situations where one partner fears the other, where they might lose access to their children, where they will be left destitute, etc.” as diminishing the culpability such that “THEY are not committing mortal sin when THEY have sexual relations in the context of that relationship.” (emphasis added) How can someone CONSENT to sexual relations if they do so out of fear, i.e., that one partner “fears the other, where [he/she] might lose access to [his/her] children, where [he/she] will be left destitute”?? What faithful priest would encourage someone in this situation to not only continue to engage in sexual relations but also to receive the Eucharist?
This is just one more example of how the ambiguities of AL and FS (yes, they exist) lead to greater harm than good.
Crimes of Passion, astutely mentioned here and also supported here by the excellent research of Brugger Ryan is a long held tradition in canon law, inclusive of the views of Saint Thomas Aquinas have been perceived both by Ecclesial law and civil law as absolving responsibility of intent. In this article the authors list extreme causes that narrow the presumed guilty party of responsibility for crime be it adultery or murder.
What must the Catholic priest in his confessional presume in hearing such a confession? Obviously, some penitents are clearly psychologically impaired, most aren’t. For the vast majority of cases as presented in this research article, those living in a second marriage more coniugale is where Francis’ famed quip, Who am I to judge? has validity. We’re not mind readers, diviners of spirits, we judge according to manifest behavior. We absolve when there’s repentance.
Difficulties may arise if the penitent believes they’re not guilty. Nevertheless, they came to the confessional to confess. It should be standard that the priest in such an instance urge the penitent to ask for absolution in any event – since as the Apostle says, I do not even judge myself before God. Although my conscience has nothing against me.
Civil law gives us a clue to this issue of confessional judgment. Crimes of passion were regularly absolved by the judicial system in highly cultured France and elsewhere. Today not so. Premeditation omits the argument for passion even if passion was involved as in the recent case of a young man assassinating a health care CEO. Anger is a passion that can be controlled and is not a valid rationale for killing someone. Terrorists attest to serious crimes against humanity that must be justly addressed. Nevertheless, he’s a terrorist. He refuses to engage injustice legally. Whereas in France during WWII Frenchman resisted German occupation with violence and were terrorists to the occupiers, heroes to the Allies. An argument can be made for justification due to the immense evil of Nazism. Priests lied when Gestapo searched monasteries for resistance fighters or Jews. Were their withholding of the true facts lies worthy of retribution before God? No. Although some have responded to this here previously insisting these were condemnable lies. That diverse position, a polarity between good and evil defines Justice, that in the end as a component of natural law is a reflection of the eternal law. As Aquinas taught, the morality of an act is determined by the object, not by the matter of the act, rather the materia sine qua non. That which the act does.
Added to my comment. Although there are mitigating conditions, the fundamental truth is the availability of grace and our required resistance to sin. John Paul II warned not to make mitigation a moral category that tends to eliminate responsibility and the reality of sin. Resistance to sin and grace are not addressed in Amoris Laetitia.
The words used by Aquinas for the designation of the object of a moral act is more accurately materia circa quam, the matter about which or matter concerning which, referring to the object or field of action of a virtue or activity.
To further clarify my reference to materia circa quam, the Latin term used by Aquinas distinguishes the person’s intent from the object, the materia circa quam – what the act itself does. For example, it has been proposed by some ethicists that a craniotomy is simply modifying the infant’s skull so that the child can pass through the birth canal. However, if the act, the materia circa quam, the object of the act, is expected to kill the child the craniotomy is actually an act of killing.
Sins of “passion” are probably avoided 99% of the time by avoiding the near occasion of sin. Hard to commit a sin of passion if you don’t set yourself up to fall to those passions you have a tendency to sin in.
Really not complicated.
Thank you for this article. Both authors have rightly highlighted the critical concerns surrounding Chapter Eight of Amoris Laetitia. Their analysis isn’t born of malice or misunderstanding, but from a genuine desire to uphold the clarity and consistency of Catholic teaching. The ambiguity they point out isn’t a minor quibble; it strikes at the heart of how we understand sin, repentance, and the reception of the Eucharist.
When a document leaves room for multiple interpretations, especially regarding fundamental moral issues, it inevitably leads to confusion and potentially harmful pastoral practices. The silence on the traditional teaching of continence for divorced and remarried couples is a significant example.
The potential for divorced and remarried Catholics to receive Holy Communion without a clear call to repentance and a firm purpose of amendment is a grave concern for all. This isn’t about excluding people; it’s about the integrity of the sacrament itself. The Eucharist is first and foremost a sign of unity with Christ and the Church, and that unity requires living in accordance with His teachings.
While Amoris Laetitia emphasizes accompaniment, the article rightly questions whether this accompaniment always leads to a genuine understanding of the sinfulness of adultery. True accompaniment should guide individuals towards conversion and a life lived in accordance with God’s law. Without finding, possessing, and living that understanding, what is the purpose of the Gospel?
Ryan and Brugger’s position is a call for clarity, a plea for consistency, and a defense of the Church’s perennial teaching. It’s a stance rooted in love for the truth and a pastoral concern for the well-being of souls.
Again, thank you a million times for such a clear, concise article on a topic that is vital to the proper functioning of the Church.
We read: “The Eucharist is first and foremost a sign of unity with Christ and the Church…”
Or, is the Eucharist “first and foremost” more than a sign (Catholics are not Calvinists) but, in the Eucharistic host, also, is fully present that which it signifies: “the body and blood, soul [!] and divinity [!]” of the incarnate Christ (CCC 1374). Not only as a concept, but as a concrete fact.
A double-hearted reception of the Eucharist, with regard to grave matter (not lesser venial sins), is first and foremost a grave sacrilege, but then also a sign. Yes?
The pre-1960ish midnight fast, or the substitute three-hour fast at least gave struggling parishioners the plausible defense in public that they had simply had a morning breakfast; now, a one-hour (!) fast. Either join the Communion line or be perceived as, what?
Do you keep a sick person from the medicine they need so as to have the illness cured?
Who is justified in “casting the first stone” rather than addressing each and every person in and with the very “love and mercy” we each hope to receive from Christ?
I am a sinner and a member of a group of sinners who make up the “ekklesia”, the community that is the “body of Christ”… I am not the “head” but, like all others, I am a part of the “heart” and I exist in this holy body in the love I both seek and the love that I give.
If you were to find yourself in the situation wherein the whole of the “Church” was decrying you as a sinner, rejecting and excluding you for that which you need so as to have your soul healed, how would you want that same Church and all of its members to treat you?
Go and do the same for all others in the name of our Lord, Jesus Christ.
Agreed! We can all go to Confession. Happy Lent!
“Then Jesus straightened up and said to her,
“Woman, where are they?
Has no one condemned you?”
She replied, “No one, sir.”
Then Jesus said, “Neither do I condemn you.
Go, and from now on do not sin any more.”
John 8
The Church excludes from Eucharist no one who has not already excluded himself.
How do you read St. Paul 1 Corinthians 11:27-30?
http://www.catholic365.com/article/11025/the-grave-danger-of-receiving-the-eucharist-unworthily.html
We are all sinners in need of God’s mercy and forgiveness. But we must seek that mercy, and to do that, we must be willing to confess our sins and seek repentence. Portraying the call to repentance as a form of persecution and victimization, as you do here, does not help anyone reach the Kingdom of God.
Perhaps people should look at what Aquinas says about polygamy and concubinage. And consider its presence in the ancestry of Jesus. And reflect on how the Orthodox churches treat this.
:What is your understanding of what Aquinas says about polygamy and concubinage?
:Jesus, as Word Incarnate, embodies both human and divine natures. Yes, Revelation does teach that all descendants of Adam and Eve inherit their original sin and its consequences. Revelation ALSO teaches that Jesus’ parents were sinless.
:How do the Orthodox churches treat this? Why should a Roman Catholic concern himself with how Muslims, pagans, tax collectors or Buddhists treat polygamy and concubinage?
But the Orthodox are Christians whose sacraments the Catholic church accepts as valid. And Jesus direct teaching was to Jews, who did not at that time all regard polygamy as adultery, though their Roman rulers did.
My understanding of Aquinas is that the obligation of monogamy is a mutual obligation to one’s spouse. And he seems to think that it arises for Christians not necessarily pagans. He does not seem to address the question of whether the obligation persists if you partner has repudiated you.
A good and worthwhile article, but it is another article in a long line of articles explaining (explaining away) a statement or writing of the current pope. It is something of a new phenomena in the church.
Thanks for this,
Many points are clearer, but I still see ambiguity in this argument against Amoris.
The author’s state that they fully recognise that certain factors “ can diminish or nullify culpability.” However, the article then considers cases where extreme factors nullify culpability (that is the persons are not culpable for the sin at all, not even venially) and rightly argue that these cannot be seriously treated as occurring in the cases for which Amoris is controversial.
For example, they state “We certainly acknowledge, .. that the violence of coercion and/or the influence of severe mental illness can render a person’s behavior, including objectively adulterous behavior, involuntary.” However, these are by no means the only cases Amoris treats.
The ambiguity I find in the article is that the situation where factors only diminish culpability are not discussed, whereby the person who commits adultery is neither fully culpable for mortal sin, nor is culpability nullified, but only diminished.
This the author’s have not treated precisely the cases that are controversial.
St John Paul II allowed an exception to the ban on communion for those in an adulterous union who committed to halting adulterous acts. Pope Francis has taken this relaxation of the discipline one step further, and included cases where adulterous acts continue, but where a priest arrives at the certainty that the penitent has a reduced culpability. However, they are still partially culpable for partially voluntary adultery, but therefore they are culpable venially, rather than mortally.
It is commonly accepted that the penitent is only required to renounce sins for which they are mortally culpable. Aquinas interprets the “I will not sin again” as referring to what he calls “sin properly speaking” that is, mortal sin. Hence the penitent does not need to reject adulterous acts for which they are only venially culpable.
Your roundabout inquiry really amplifies Pedro Gabriel’s conundrums and wanton.
The Lord teaches us to fight temptation and to pray to fight temptation, not to remain sedated in mortal sin and not to remain sedated in venial sin.
The prayer in which He instructs us, says, “And lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil.” It does not say “And lead us in venial sin because we don’t yet understand how much it is mortal sin and can’t catch it.”
You see how wrong you are now. Wrong and bad. You have to confess it I think. Because it is showing you a badness to which you are subject and over which you cause others to fumble and trip while feeling it as justified and needed and important.
For your information this is not a novel business; it already has caused a lot of unmitigated damage, lingering suffering and multiplied sins and persists for temptations’ and scandals’ sakes, in which you become complicit and of which you are just another unfortunate sign.
Long before Pope Francis allowed some Italians Sees to change that part of the Lord’s prayer, he had been toying with doing exactly that while simultaneously letting things slip during those times. And this is where it has reached.
The only answer for the priest and bishop is, “I may not counsel such things for you.” Unless you seek to hear and live out a terrible Judgment Day verdict, “Stand apart, Packing Goat!”
Elias,
I suppose you are replying to my post.
If you think I am in error, please be specific so I can understand. I am very open to learning more…just have a look at my next post if you wish….
I agree with you that there is not enough clarity on these issues, and this is why I appreciate the points made in the articles by Brugger and Ryan.
However, I feel they are more ambiguous that Pope Francis.
Just there ambiguity seems to err on the over-rigorous side, at the same time they are combatting ambiguity on the lax side.
As well as overly lax disciplines regarding reception of the Sacrament of Penance, the Church has also condemned overly rigourous interpretations, such as the Novatians who did not accept the lapsed back to the sacraments, and then later those who would only acknowledge one chance for Penance for grave sin after baptism, and more recently, the Jansenists.
To see how the current debate is a natural segue to the battle against the rigorism of Jansen:
“ The Jesuits encouraged the faithful, whether or not they were struggling with sin, to receive the Eucharist frequently, arguing that Christ instituted it as a means to holiness for sinners, and stating that the only requirement for receiving Communion (apart from baptism) was that the communicant be free of mortal sin at the time of reception. Antoine Arnauld responded to them in 1643 with De la fréquente communion (‘Of frequent communion’),representing the deeply pessimistic theology of Jansenism, and discouraged frequent Communion, arguing that a high degree of perfection, including purification from attachment to venial sin, was necessary before approaching the sacrament.”
This idea that a person needs to be free from detachment to venial sin to receive communion was condemned in the years after Jansen. A number of prominent cardinals opposed the pope condemning this rigorism.
The current debate is a continuation, because the pope is now clarifying that, while it is necessary to commit to avoid all mortally culpable sin, it is not required that the adulterer commit to avoiding adultery for which they are only venially culpable.
Nevertheless, what is still lacking in those advocating this position is a clear exhortation that with grace we are called to overcome all sin: “Go and sin no more.” We should be committed to avoiding all mortal sin, so that we seek the grace and circumstances to avoid mortal sin. We need to be reminded that we need to be purified from attachment to sin, including venial sin, before we enter heaven.
Your segue multiplies conundrums and wanton, fellow.
JPII did not make an “exception.” This is a mischaracterization promoted by the likes of P. Gabriel and those at “wherepeteris.” The parties take actions to eliminate the adulterous situation, including in an objective way. In this regard it is frequently overlooked that they are first asked to separate and live as though single. It is only if there are serious reasons that they are unable to do so- not unwilling but unable- that they can still live in the same residence and live in continence. And if they can’t seperate they would also be advised to go to another parish at which they/their situation is unknown. Again, this aims at removing the objective situation of living as though husband and wife. Hence, it is not allowing an exception but requiring actions to undo the source of the problem. It is thus completely different, and not just in degree but in kind, to what is now proposed- that the couple doesn’t have to do anything to counter the situation. They still commit adultery and continue in the objective situation of living as husband and wife; which also means it is not just a matter of individual acts of adultery. You can see, for one, there is a complete shift from addressing the objective situation to focusing now solely on the subjective- on the one hand, stopping the adultery and cohabitation to now claiming they may not be sinning mortally in committing what is still the objectively grave sin and situation. The fact that the objective situation is not remedied in any way is one reason why the “reduced culpability” argument was explicitly considered and rejected under JPII. This is where we start to run into the problem of contradiction to previous teaching.
In a way, I don’t know why this is really even being debated, as JPII’s magisterium explicitly considered and rejected the idea that “reduced culpability”- in so many words- was reason to allow for the divorced and remarried to receive communion. One reason is because the objective situation of the new “union” is pre-eminent and remains regardless of subjective culpability. As Francis has now clearly claimed to allow communion in such cases, he is in contradiction to all that came before. It’s thus also dishonest that people like the folks at wherepeteris- and editor mike lewis is infamous for his dishonesty- are still trying to deny that A.L. promotes a heterodox interpretation, which they unwittingly admit to, except they now want to redefine it as orthodox. The latter is key to many of their efforts- they simply now label heterodoxy as orthodoxy and vice versa, hence problem solved in their eyes.
They have now also started doing so with contraception and women’s ordination, for example, now that it’s apparent Francis is trying to tinker with those issues. A.L. and Francis’ thinking have been explicitly sighted by various authorities as the motive for the questioning of these teachings, another reason it’s dishonest for people to deny that A.L. isn’t promoting heterodoxy. There’s also the ample material from a few official, but mostly what one would describe as quasi-official sources, that confirm the supposed “misinterpretation” that Gabriel and others claim isn’t what is intended: the 2022 Vatican sponsored conference on the correct interpretation of A.L., publications of Vatican Dicasteries, statements from Curial officials, articles in l’osservatore romano and civilta cattolica, the revised curriculum at Rome’s JPII institute, gestures of approval by Francis of episcopal guidelines that go even way beyond the argentinian, e.g., the maltese. On the flip side, there has been a failure to promote orthodox interpretations which discount the problems brugger and ryan point out, or even to attack them by Francis and co. In this regard note that Gabriel almost exclusively cites private opinions for his claims, not anything more authoritative.
Let us also note that Gabriel et al. have refuted themselves, taking opposing positions at different points in time, e.g., remember when there was initial indication that Francis was going to tinker with communion for the D & R and these folks rushed out to assure us this couldn’t be the case, because this would involve a doctrinal contradiction to the entire previous magisterium. Then when it was apparent Francis was doing it, they then twisted themselves in knots to explain what they themselves said was impossible was now magically so. Or, they (dishonestly) claim there is no confusion, ambiguity, it’s all perfectly clear, yet there are different interpretations even among contributors to wherepeteris and others in their orbit; while they have to write entire books to try to to tell us what Francis “really” meant.