The situation in Syria “is worse now than under ISIS”

“A knife must be put to their throats… This is their medicine.”

These chilling words echoed through a mosque in Idlib, a province in northwestern Syria, were spoken by a jihadist cleric inciting his followers to violence. The sermon, captured on video and provided by a team member from Free Burma Rangers (FBR)—a faith-based frontline aid organization operating in Burma, Syria, and Iraq—leaves no doubt about the intent behind the recent massacres.

Jihad and the March 11th mass killings

“Striking with an iron fist, the media doesn’t care… Diplomatic smiles are useless; the solution with them is fighting,” the mullah continued, calling for jihad as the only path forward.

While Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group now ruling Syria, claims to have distanced itself from its extremist past, the reality on the ground tells a different story. The systematic targeting of minorities, mass killings, and the forced displacement of entire communities make clear that religious extremism remains deeply embedded in the new regime.

Idlib has long been a stronghold of HTS and other Islamist factions, serving as the main center of jihadist activity in the country. It is from Idlib that extremist ideology and calls for violence frequently spread, meaning this sermon likely helped incite the massacres that followed.

Around March 9-11, 2025, a brutal slaughter began in Syria’s coastal regions of Latakia and Tartus, in which entire Alawite communities were exterminated. According to human rights groups, 132 Alawite civilians were killed in a single day, with the overall death toll surpassing 1,225. UN reports and eyewitness accounts confirm that entire families—men, women, and children—were executed in their homes, with some witnesses suggesting the true number of those killed is far higher.

Official reports state that the attacks were carried out by a coalition of anti-government insurgents led by HTS, which traces its roots to the former al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.

HTS is led by Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, formerly known as Ahmad Hussein al-Shara. Alongside HTS, factions of the Syrian National Army (SNA)—which evolved from Islamist militias such as Ahrar al-Sham—also participated in the violence. Now claiming to be the de facto government of Syria after ousting President Bashar al-Assad, HTS has attempted to present itself as a legitimate governing authority.

In both internal messaging and international outreach, it has pledged to uphold law, ensure security, and protect religious and ethnic minorities. Yet, the massacres in Latakia and Tartus—along with the open calls for jihad—expose the emptiness of those promises.

A deliberate campaign of ethnic cleansing

Emil, a young man who witnessed the massacres, said the attackers included not only uniformed soldiers but also armed civilians. “Sunni factions and militias,” he explained. “These militias—they’re not wearing specific military insignia or uniforms.” He also reported that in the days leading up to the massacre, mosques throughout the area broadcasted calls for jihad against minority groups, urging locals to take part in the violence.

These claims were independently confirmed by a Free Burma Rangers (FBR) team member, who described how mosques in the region urged people to support the new regime, now calling itself the Syrian Army.

“They told the people to help cleanse Syria’s coastline of the remnants of the Assad regime,” the FBR member said. “All the mosques in that region are Sunni, and they encouraged everyone to join the movement to purge the area.”

Both FBR team members and civilian witnesses have described the attacks as a deliberate campaign of ethnic cleansing, contradicting the official narrative put forth by al-Jolani’s government. The regime claims that a few rogue soldiers acted independently, targeting only regime loyalists.

However, with the overwhelming majority of victims being ethnic and religious minorities, this was no isolated incident—it was a coordinated attempt to reshape the region by force.

“The situation is worse now than under ISIS,” said the FBR Syria team leader. A veteran of the war against ISIS, he has been on the ground in Syria since the most recent massacre and has firsthand knowledge of how horrific the situation was during ISIS’s reign—and how much worse it has become. He explained that during the ISIS years, there was at least a sense of clarity—everyone knew who the enemy was and shared a common goal of defeating them.

“Back then, we had a common enemy—everyone wanted ISIS out,” he said. “At least with ISIS, people knew what they were dealing with and could find ways to comply and survive. Now, with all this fragmentation and everyone just trying to stay alive, there’s much more uncertainty.”

“Ethnic cleansing,” warned a team member from Free Burma Rangers, “means all minorities—Alawites, Christians, Druze, Kurds—everyone has to go.” The massacre and the growing threat of further violence have triggered the mass displacement of tens of thousands of civilians, especially from vulnerable groups frequently labeled “infidels” by hardliners and jihadis.

Many have fled in fear of targeted persecution and religious extermination, seeking refuge in Kurdish-controlled areas or across the border in Lebanon—escaping what many believe is only the beginning of a broader campaign to erase Syria’s minorities.

Fragile stability, but for how long?

Karam Abi Yazbeck, who works for Caritas, a Catholic charity serving the Middle East and North Africa, is stationed in Lebanon, where he says thousands of newly arrived refugees are in urgent need of aid. He explained that the attacks took place in Syria’s littoral region, an area long known for its large Alawite and Christian populations.

“Many massacres happened,” he said. “Not only Alawites were affected—some Christian communities have also been targeted. Some Christians have been killed, not just Alawites.”

The major Christian communities in the region include Assyrian Christians—such as Chaldeans and Syriacs—found mainly in Iraq and Syria; and Maronite Christians, who are concentrated in Lebanon. These churches, along with the Melkite Greek Catholics, are Eastern rite Catholic churches in full communion with the See of Rome.

Other prominent groups include the Greek Orthodox, who belong to the Patriarchate of Antioch. These and the Melkite Greek Catholics are historically rooted in major cities such as Damascus, Aleppo, and Beirut.

Smaller but still significant Christian populations include the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Copts—though it is important to note that while Coptic Catholics are in communion with Rome, the Coptic Orthodox Church, which represents the majority of Copts, is not.

In a powerful video statement, Patriarch John X Yazigi, head of the Greek Orthodox Church of Antioch, condemned the massacres and demanded government accountability. He described how civilians—many of them women and children—were killed, homes were burned and looted, and entire communities targeted simply for being Alawite or Christian. He warned that the chants and slogans used by the perpetrators were fueling sectarian hatred and destabilizing civil peace.

The Patriarch spoke with sorrow about displaced residents being shot after fleeing their homes and sacred Christian symbols being desecrated. “The icon of the Virgin Mary,” he said, “was shattered, trampled upon, and desecrated. She is honored not only by us, but by all Muslims, as the Quran dedicates an entire chapter to her—Surah Maryam.”

Addressing the leadership of the new regime, he said: “Mr. President, this is not your message. These actions contradict your vision for a new Syria after the revolution’s victory. We call upon you to recognize the bloody events taking place.”

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Karam Abi Yazbeck who survived the Lebanese Civil War, said the violence brings back painful memories. “It reminds us of all those massacres that happened between Lebanese communities—Druze and Christians, Muslims and Christians—during the war.”

He explained that the region’s sectarian divisions run deep. In the Middle East, religion often serves as the primary identity, outweighing national allegiance. “People feel their belonging more to their religion, and even more specifically to their denomination,” he said. This explains why tensions persist: Alawites, though Muslim, are not accepted by many Sunnis, and the well-known Sunni-Shia divide remains unresolved. Meanwhile, Druze are often viewed as heretics, and Christians and Jews are broadly rejected by many Islamist sects.

Karam suspects the current wave of mass displacement may be part of a broader effort to transform Middle Eastern states into ethnically or religiously homogeneous entities. “On one hand, the massacres are terrifying, but on the other is how they are promoted—how they trigger people to leave their homes, their villages, to leave Syria,” he said.

Most of the Alawites who fled across the border have taken refuge in areas of northern Lebanon where Alawite communities already exist, while Christians are sheltering within Christian towns and villages. A similar pattern has emerged inside Syria, where Kurds have fled to the Kurdish-controlled region of Rojava, officially known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).

According to reports from Syria, sporadic killings continue, though the situation has temporarily stabilized. An FBR team member noted that many minority families are keeping a low profile, with some remaining in their homes out of fear. “They feel very threatened,” he said, as no one knows when or where the next outbreak of violence might occur.

From across the border in Lebanon, Karam Abi Yazbeck warned that the ongoing influx of refugees could further destabilize the region.

“Fifteen years ago, big clashes happened between Alawite and Sunni in Tripoli,” he recalled. “This is already a fragile and volatile environment. With the arrival of Alawites fleeing Syria, we fear that renewed violence there could spark similar unrest here—especially between those same communities.”

While every civilian in Syria now lives under the shadow of conflict, the threat is particularly acute for ethnic and religious minorities, who appear to be the targets of a slow-moving campaign of ethnic cleansing—one that could accelerate at any moment.

The violence may have paused for now, but the region remains on edge, with the risk of further bloodshed looming not only in Syria but in neighboring Lebanon as well.